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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 13, 1999, plaintiffs Thomas Sutherland and his family
filed a multi-count complaint against defendants Islamic Republic of
Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security alleging that
the defendants were responsible for plaintiff Sutherland's kidnapping,
detention, and torture by the Hizbollah terrorist group in Lebanon. On
June 25, 2001, after entry of default, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia awarded the plaintiffs $53,040,000 in
compensatory damages and $300,000,000 in punitive damages. In the
conclusion of its opinion, the District Court observed: "today's holding
is not a foreign policy edict; rather it is an edict on the rule of law. It is
an edict that reaffirms the unflinching principle that those who
intentionally harm United States nationals will be held accountable for
that harm in United States courts."'
This article discusses the rules of procedural law that authorize United
States courts to enter civil judgments against international terrorists and
the foreign states that sponsor them. Somewhat surprisingly, these rules
do not make such judgments difficult to obtain. As the Sutherland case
1. Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2001).
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illustrates, plaintiffs have already recovered substantial money judgments
against terrorist defendants. Not surprisingly, the real difficulties are
encountered when plaintiffs seek to enforce such judgments.
Private parties have successfully utilized civil litigation as a means of
neutralizing domestic hate groups. The question now is whether they
can achieve similar success with respect to international terrorists.
Success in this context is measured by two basic goals: compensating
victims of international terrorism, and deterring future wrongful acts on
the part of international terrorist organizations and their state sponsors.
This article attempts to provide some assessment of whether the rules of
domestic and international procedural law permit private parties to
accomplish these goals.
There has been a considerable amount of civil litigation involving
international terrorism, even before the attacks in New York and Washington
on September 11, 2001. Nearly all these cases have resulted in default
judgments. As a consequence, few appeals have been taken and many of
the procedural issues have not been addressed by appellate courts. This
article therefore begins with discussion of. the three components that
determine the validity of a default judgment within the United States
courts: personal jurisdiction, service of process, and subject matter
jurisdiction. Other issues discussed include venue and forum non
conveniens, choice-of-law and jurisdiction to prescribe, the Act of State
Doctrine, and judgments and enforcement of judgments. This Article
concludes with some suggestions for the courts, the Congress, and the
Executive branch that may provide victims of international terrorism
with more effective means of redress through civil litigation.
There are three sets of factual variables that significantly affect the
analysis of these procedural issues. One is whether the defendant
committed the harmful act and caused injury to the plaintiff within the
territory of the United States or outside the territory of the United States.
The second is whether the defendant is a private party or a foreign
sovereign entity. The third is whether the defendant's assets, potentially
available to satisfy a civil judgment, are located within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States or are located outside United States
territory. Each of these factual variations raise distinct, yet related,
issues as to the proper application of the rules of procedural law. The
analysis below addresses these issues in the context of each of these
factual variations.
1H. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING A VALID JUDGMENT
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
1. Private Party Defendants
a. Due Process Limitations, Generally
Personal jurisdiction has both a statutory and a constitutional
component. First, a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant must be authorized by a long-arm statute or rule. Second,
even if so authorized, the exercise of jurisdiction must also be consistent
with the Due Process Clause. As explained in the Supreme Court's
seminal decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 the Due
Process Clause requires, as a prerequisite to a binding judgment, that a
nonresident defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum
state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.",3 The main focus of this
"minimum contacts" analysis is whether the defendant has purposefully
conducted activities in the forum state.4 This "purposeful availment"
requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into court solely
as a result of attenuated contacts with the forum state, or of the unilateral
activity of the plaintiff or some third party. 5 The rationale for this
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Id. at 316.
4. As the Supreme Court first explained in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958), and repeated in subsequent decisions, "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Id. at 253.
5. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). The Supreme Court
has repeatedly invalidated state court assertions of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants who have not themselves engaged in purposeful conduct directed at residents
in the forum state. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295-99
(holding that Oklahoma court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over several defendants,
including New York car dealer and eastcoast distributor, in products liability action
violated the Due Process Clause because these defendants did not conduct any
purposeful activities in the forum state, such as marketing or selling cars to Oklahoma
residents, even though allegedly defective car caused injury to plaintiffs in Oklahoma);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supeior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (ruling that a component manufacturer's knowledge that the final product will
be sold in the forum state by ultimate manufacturer was insufficient and that some
additional conduct by the component manufacturer itself, such as marketing or
advertising, must be directed at the forum state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
94-95 (1978) (holding that a California court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant father in child support action violated the Due Process Clause because the
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requirement is to provide the defendant with fair warning as to what
conduct will and will not subject it to suit in the forum state.6
The nature of the minimum contacts inquiry varies with the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and cause of action. When a state
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit "arising out of
or related to" the defendant's contacts with the forum, the state is said to
be exercising "specific jurisdiction."7  But when a state exercises
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a suit not arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the state is
said to be exercising "general jurisdiction" over the defendant.8 In a
general jurisdiction case, because the cause of action has no relationship
to the forum state, a court may assert personal jurisdiction consistent
with due process only if a nonresident defendant's forum activities are
"continuous and systematic." 9 By contrast, in a specific jurisdiction case
there is some nexus between the cause of action and the forum, therefore
due process requires a lessor quantum of contacts by the defendant.
Indeed, a single contact, such as a tortuous act committed by a
nonresident defendant in the forum state, may be sufficient where it
directly gives rise to the cause of action. 10
There is a second level of constitutional analysis with respect to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Once a court has examined the
defendant's "minimum contacts" with the forum state, these contacts
defendant's passive acquiescence in his children's move to California did not mean he
had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protection of California's laws).
6. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (observing that when a
nonresident defendant purposefully conducts activities within the forum state "it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there.").
7. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8
(1984).
8. Id. at 414 n.9. The type of general jurisdiction referred to here is based on a
nonresident defendant's activities in the forum state that are unrelated to the plaintiff's
cause of action. Another type of general jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as
"transient" or "tag-service" jurisdiction, based solely on service of process on the
defendant while physically present within the forum state, has been unanimously
approved by the Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
9. See Helicopteros Nationales de Colom., S.A., 460 U.S. at 416; International
Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318.
10. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (observing that even a single or
occasional acts committed within the forum state can confer jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission). However, the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment against a nonresident defendant with whom the state has "no
contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 319
must be evaluated in light of other factors to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is "reasonable."" These factors were
identified by the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court12 as follows:
A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its
determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several states
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." 13
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to what these
"reasonableness" factors mean or as to how they are to be weighed with
respect to each other and with respect to the "minimum contacts"
analysis. 14  The Court relied on these factors to divest the court of
jurisdiction in Asahi, but has also explained that these factors may "serve
to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."1 5
Although roundly criticized for increasing unpredictability, 6 the
Supreme Court's adoption of the "reasonableness" factors as a second
level of due process analysis is significant for international litigation.
Some of these factors promote a cautious approach to the extension of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.17 For example, the "burden on
the defendant" factor, as applied by the Supreme Court in Asahi,
11. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
12. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
13. Id. at 113.
14. See Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 927 (2000) (explaining that the
"reasonableness" inquiry requires a court to make an "unguided, fact-specific, ad hoc
determination as to the propriety of personal jurisdiction in each case, regardless of
whether the minimum contacts requirement has been satisfied.").
15. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 14, at 925-27 (reviewing authorities that criticize
the subjective nature of the reasonableness inquiry and concluding that the absence of
meaningful standards permits a court to justify any "reasonableness" conclusion it
desires); Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn't Know Its Asahi From Its Wortman: A
Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 887-88 & 891-95 (1990) (criticizing the complexity and
uncertainty of the ad hoc balancing required by the reasonableness test); Russell J.
Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55,
62-63 (1988) (discussing the uncertainty of balancing fairness considerations against
minimum contacts); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of
Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 19, 76-78 (1990) (criticizing Asahi's use of the reasonableness factors as further
muddying the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction).
17. The Asahi court explicitly cautioned that "[g]reat care and reserve should be
exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international
field." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
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suggests that foreign defendants may have an even greater level of due
process protection than that accorded domestic defendants with respect
to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.' 8
However, some of the other reasonableness factors may actually
encourage courts to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
Unlike the "minimum contacts" test, which is only concerned with
protecting the rights of defendants,' 9 the "reasonableness" factors are
designed to accommodate additional interests, such as those of plaintiffs
and of the forum state. These interests would certainly include the
plaintiff's interest in seeking compensation for injuries caused by
international terrorism, and the forum state's interest in ensuring its
residents who are victims of terrorism are appropriately compensated.
Moreover, a forum state certainly has a strong interest in deterring future
acts of terrorism within its borders. Such interests may be significant
factors in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
defendants accused of international terrorism is reasonable, particularly
in cases where the sufficiency of the foreign defendants' contacts with
the forum is questionable.2°
b. Terrorist Acts by Private Parties
The current due process doctrine of personal jurisdiction, therefore,
consists of two components. The first level of analysis is to determine
whether the defendant has sufficient "minimum contracts" with the
forum state; the second is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
"reasonable" based on several factors. As discussed above, foreign
defendants are entitled to at least the same level of due process
18. Applying this factor in the context of a Taiwanese corporate plaintiff suing a
Japanese corporate defendant for indemnity in a California state court, the Asahi court
remarked: "The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching
the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders." Id. at 114.
19. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects the defendant's
individual liberty interest, preserved by the Due Process Clause, to be free from the
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum, unless that defendant has
purposeful connections with the forum. See Insurance Corp. of Ire., Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); Heiser, supra note 14, at 930-35.
20. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 1998)
(finding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign state sponsors of terrorism
ensures fair play and substantial justice to American victims of international terrorism
and is therefore reasonable).
protections with respect to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by
United States courts as are domestic defendants. 2
1
With respect to terrorist acts committed by private defendants within
the territory of the United States, such as those directed at the World
Trade Center in New York City, the personal jurisdiction question is
easily resolved. By intentionally engaging in terrorist acts designed to
cause deaths and injuries within New York, these defendants have
purposely engaged in wrongful conduct within the forum state. Such
purposeful conduct provides both the statutory and the constitutional
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who purposely caused harm
within the forum state is almost a universally accepted basis for personal
jurisdiction in tort litigation.23
If the terrorist act occurs overseas, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a private defendant by a court in the United States presents more
difficult issues. The defendant must have sufficient contacts with the
forum state, or with the United States as a whole in cases where national
contacts may be considered,24 to make the assertion of personal jurisdiction
fair and reasonable. A foreign individual or group may simply have no
contacts with the United States, making the assertion of personal jurisdiction
impossible based on any theory of minimum contacts. Other bases for
21. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (1987) (applying due process limitations to a
California court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant Japanese
corporation); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1983)(holding that the defendant Colombian corporation lacked sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause). Indeed,
foreign defendants may have an even greater level of due process protection than that
accorded domestic defendants. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
22. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)(recognizing that the commission of a single act within the forum state, because of its
nature and quality, may be sufficient to render the defendant subject to suit in that state);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process where nonresident defendant's intentional and tortious
actions were expressly aimed at, and knowingly caused injury in, the forum state). New
York's long-arm statute expressly authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who commits a tortuous act within the state. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)
(McKinney 2001).
23. For example, Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, which governs personaljurisdiction among the member states of the European Community, authorizes personaljurisdiction in tort cases "in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred."
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, Eur. Cmty. Member States, 8 I.L.M. 229, 232 (1969),
reprinted as amended in Consolidated and Updated Version of the Brussels Convention
of 1968 and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1989 Accession of Spain and Portugal,
1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1419 (1990).
24. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91-95
(D. R.I. 2001) (dismissing terrorist claims against various officers of Palestinian
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proper jurisdiction, such as consent by general appearance or transient
jurisdiction by service of the complaint and summons on the defendant
while physically present within the forum state, are possible 26 but unlikely.
One important issue relevant to the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants is whether the Due Process Clause permits a
"national contacts" approach. Under the national contacts test, a federal court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on an
aggregation of contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than the
defendant's contacts with the State in which the federal court sits.
Several courts have construed federal statutes to authorize jurisdiction based
on the defendant's national contacts.27 Moreover, Rule 4(k)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1993, also authorizes this
approach as to federal claims, although only when there is no state that
can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.28 Although the Supreme Court
Authority because these individual defendants lacked any contacts with United States
whatsoever). But see Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 50-52 (2nd Cir.
1991) (indicating that personal jurisdiction over the PLO may be proper based on its
continuous and systematic "business" contacts with New York, such as fund raising and
proselytizing, unrelated to its activities as a permanent observer at the UN); Estates of
Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d, at 88-91 (holding personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO
and PA based on their continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a
whole).
26. See Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (ruling the delivery of the
complaint and summons to general agents for defendants PLO and PA while in the
United States provided a basis for personal jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process
Clause).
27. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989)
(applying national contacts test to uphold personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants
with respect to antitrust claims under the Clayton Act); Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 132, 139-40 (2nd Cir. 1972) (applying national contacts test
to determine personal jurisdiction with respect to claims under Securities Exchange Act);
See Transport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 580 (2nd Cir.
1993) (construing the FSIA to authorize personal jurisdiction over defendant Romanian
agency based on its contacts with the United States as a whole); Estates of Ungar, 153 F.
Supp. 2d at 87-88 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) to authorize nationwide service of
process and national contacts test for personal jurisdiction).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) & note (1993 Amendment, Subdivision (k)). See
United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 38-46 (1st Cir. 1999)
(discussing the showing required by plaintiff seeking to use national contacts test
authorized by Rule 4(k)(2); Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92 (discussing the
circumstances under which a plaintiff may utilize national contacts under Rule 4(k)(2) to
establish personal jurisdiction over defendants who allegedly committed terrorist acts
overseas). See also Stephen B. Burbank, The United States' Approach to International
Civil Litigation: Recent Developments in Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1,
8-14 (1998) (discussing lower federal courts' use of national contacts test under Rule
4(k)(2)).
has yet to rule on this issue,29 the lower federal courts have uniformly, °
endorsed the national contacts approach, including some that have
upheld personal jurisdiction over terrorists groups based on their
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. 1
The national contacts approach permits a United States court to assert
general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, based on that defendant's
continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a whole.32
This issue is very important with respect to defendants who are foreign
terrorists organizations, and, as discussed below, may also be relevant
with respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign
defendants who sponsor terrorism. The constitutionality of the national
contacts approach appears to be a foregone conclusion. The Supreme
29. The Supreme Court has twice declined to rule on whether the national contacts
approach is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Asahi,
480 U.S. at 113 n.29; Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5(1987). In a subsequent decision, however, the Court seemed to employ a national
contacts test in determining that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Argentina
under the FSIA, based on its commercial activity in the United States, was consistent
with the Due Process Clause. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619
(1992) (dictum).
30. Nearly every federal circuit has held that when the personal jurisdiction of a
federal court is invoked based upon a federal statute providing for nationwide or
worldwide service, the applicable forum for minimum contacts purposes is the United
States as a whole. See SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1997 ) (adopting
the national contacts test and citing to six other circuits that have held that the national
contacts test is constitutionally appropriate); cases cited supra note 27.
31. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25. See also Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp.
2d at 88-89 (concluding that assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO's
and PA's based on their fundraising, commercial, and public relations campaigns
throughout the United States was consistent with due process); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 21-23 (1998) (upholding personal jurisdiction over Iran
and its agencies with respect to claims of state-sponsored terrorism, based on their
national contacts with the United States).
32. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Lines, 937 F.2d 44, 50-52 (2nd Cir.
1991) (indicating that personal jurisdiction over the PLO may be proper based on its
continuous and systematic "business" contacts with New York, such as fund raising and
proselytizing, unrelated to its activities as a permanent observer at the UN); Estates of
Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 88-91 (holding personal jurisdiction over defendants PLO and
PA based on their continuous and systematic contacts with the United States as a whole).
33. In addition to its endorsement by nearly all the federal circuits, see supra note
27, the academic literature generally views the national contacts approach as consistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when utilized by federal courts in
cases involving federal statutes, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976(hereinafter FSIA). E.g., Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of
Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39
HASTINGS L. J. 799, 813-24 (1988) (explaining why national contacts approach should
determine personal jurisdiction as to foreign defendants); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction
Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 124-44 (1983) (discussing why
the federal courts should apply the minimum contacts test to foreign defendants based on
their contacts with the United States as a whole); Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 402-07 (1982) (arguing that
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Court should definitively resolve this issue, and do so in a manner that
upholds the constitutionality of the "national contacts" approach where
authorized by a federal statute or rule.
34
2. Foreign Sovereign Defendants
The exercise of personal jurisdiction by one sovereign over another
may be more politically sensitive, but the legal issues are actually less
complicated than those encountered when the defendant is a foreign
private party. The lower federal courts have had little difficulty in
deciding to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign entities
alleged to be sponsors of international terrorism. 35 The main reason for
this is the existence of a comprehensive federal statute, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter, "FSIA"), 36 that not only
removes a foreign country's sovereign immunity when the statutory
requirements are satisfied, but also provides an aggressive long-arm
statute applicable to acts of state-sponsored terrorism within the United
States and abroad.
The FSIA is the exclusive basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction
over a foreign country or its agencies or instrumentalities.37 Under the
in suits against foreign governments under the FSIA, the relevant contacts are those with
the United States and not just those with the forum state).
34. The Supreme Court may have already employed the national contacts test in
determining the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction asserted over a foreign state
pursuant to the FSIA, but did so in dicta and without any real discussion of the issue.
See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619-20 (ruling that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Argentina as authorized by the FSIA was consistent with the Due Process Clause
because Argentina purposely conducted commercial activities within the United States).
35. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d
10, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000) (upholding personal jurisdiction over Libya under § 1605(a)(7)
of FSIA in an action seeking damages for alleged hostage-taking and torture); Daliberti
v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40 (D.D.C. 2000) (upholding personal jurisdiction
over Iraq under state-sponsored terrorism provisions of FSIA); Cicippio v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (exercising personal jurisdiction
over defendant Iran under FSIA in action seeking damages for alleged kidnaping,
imprisonment, and torture by agents of Iran); Flatow, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1, 34 (upholding
personal jurisdiction over Iran in wrongful death action brought under state-sponsored
terrorism provisions of FSIA); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1247-
48 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (upholding jurisdiction over Cuba under state-sponsored terrorism
provisions of FSIA).
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
37. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443
(1989) (holding that the FSIA is the exclusive basis for asserting jurisdiction over
foreign states, and therefore the district court could not assert jurisdiction over Argentina
under the Alien Tort Statute); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (noting
FSIA, a foreign state is presumed to be immune from suit, and is in fact
immune unless one or more of the exceptions to immunity enumerated
in the FSIA apply.38 When the plaintiff presents facts that satisfy one of
these statutory exceptions, the FSIA not only removes the foreign
sovereign's immunity from suit but also simultaneously provides the
court with the basis for both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 39
Although when enacted the FSLA was primarily designed to eliminate
the sovereign immunity defense in civil actions against foreign sovereign
entities arising out of their commercial activities, two provisions of the
FSIA are now directly applicable to litigation involving state-sponsored
acts of international terrorism.
a. The FSIA's "Noncommercial Tort" Exception to
Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA removes immunity in any case "in
which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United
States and caused by the tortuous act or omission of that foreign state or
of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment., 40  The lower federal courts have
construed this so-called "noncommercial tort" exception to include a
"situs" requirement. Not only must the complained of injury have
occurred within the territory of the United States, but the alleged
tortuous conduct causing the injury also must have taken place in the
United States.4' In addition, pursuant to section 1605(a)(5)(A), the
the FSIA is the exclusive basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign states).
38. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Nelson, 507 U.S. at 355.
39. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435 n.3; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Niger., 461 U.S. 480, 483-88 (1983). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994), federal
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any claim for relief against a foreign
state with respect to which the foreign state is "not entitled to immunity ... under §§
1605-1607," and § 1330(b) provides personal jurisdiction whenever subject matter
jurisdiction exists under subsection (a) and service of process has been made under §
1608 of the FSIA.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (Supp. V 1999). The FSIA defines the "United States"
to include "all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (1994).
41. See, e.g., Olsen ex rel Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 645-
46 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff must "allege at least one entire tort occurring
in the United States" in order to utilize § 1605(a)(5)); In re SEDCO, Inc., 543 F. Supp.
1561, 1567 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding § 1605(a)(5) inapplicable where the alleged
tortuous acts all took place in Mexico, even though environmental injury occurred in the
United States); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling that §
1605(a)(5) does not deny sovereign immunity to Mexico's Secretary of Government for
alleged kidnaping because the entire tort must be committed in United States); Amerada
Hess, 488 U.S. at 439-40 (observing in dicta that § 1605(a)(5) covers only torts
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noncommercial tort exception does not apply to claims arising out of a
foreign state's performance of a "discretionary function." Despite this
exemption's lack of precise contours,42 the courts have had little
difficulty in concluding that a foreign state has no discretion to commit,
or have one of its officers or agents commit, an illegal act.
43
Consequently, neither the situs requirement nor the discretionary
function exemption would preclude the use of the FSIA's noncommercial tort
exception in a civil action against a foreign country brought by a private
party seeking damages for injuries caused by a state-sponsored act of
terrorism occurring within the United States. Because the FSIA both
removes sovereign immunity and provides the exclusive basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign country, a court has the statutory
authority to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant foreign
sovereign entity in any action which satisfies the noncommercial tort
exception set forth in section 1605(a)(5). The question then is whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 1605(a)(5) is
consistent with the Constitution.
The extent to which the Due Process Clause protects a foreign
sovereign is a matter of some debate. 44 But even assuming that the same
occurring within the United States). Several lower federal courts have applied the situs
requirement of § 1605(a)(5) to deny jurisdiction in cases involving terrorists acts
occurring outside the United States. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 246 (2d. Cir. 1996) (holding the FSIA does not subject Libya
to jurisdiction with respect to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103); Persinger v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 839-942 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting FSIA jurisdiction
over Iran for torts committed at the U.S. embassy in Tehran); McKeel v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
42. Although the FSIA contains no definition of what constitutes a "discretionary
function," the language and legislative history of the FSIA indicate that this exemption
corresponds to the discretionary act exception found in the Federal Torts Claim Act.
H.R. Rep. No. 1487, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6620. See Risk v.
Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1991) (observing that "whether the acts of the
[foreign state] officials are within the discretionary function exception to the FSIA is
controlled by principles developed under the Federal Torts Claim Act.").
43. See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C.
1980) (holding that defendants, Chile and its agents, cannot claim sovereign immunity
under the FSIA for their alleged involvement in the bombing deaths of Orlando Letilier
and others in Washington D.C., because defendants had no "discretion" within the
meaning of § 1605(a)(5)(A) to order or aid in such a political assassination); Liu v.
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058
(1990) (holding that defendant Republic of China did not satisfy the discretionary
function exemption of § 1605(a)(5)(A) in a wrongful death action alleging defendant's
Director of Intelligence Bureau arranged killing in United States).
44. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
constitutional limitations apply to the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns as apply to private individuals, those limitations
will be readily satisfied in noncommercial tort litigation under section
1605(a)(5). A foreign sovereign entity whose agents or employees
purposefully engaged in injurious conduct within the United States
certainly has had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such
that the maintenance of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
45
b. The FSIA 's State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to
Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Congress amended the FSIA in 1996 to specifically include provisions
designed to hold rogue states accountable for acts of terrorism
perpetrated on United States citizens. These state-sponsored terrorism
provisions, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 199646 and codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(7),
provide an exception to a foreign sovereign's immunity from suit for
actions where money damages are sought against a foreign sovereign
"for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources ... for such an act.",47  Because the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act did not authorize a
specific cause of action for victims of state-sponsored terrorism,
Congress also enacted a separate piece of legislation 48 which provides a
cause of action against a foreign state or its agents for any act which
would give a court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(7).49
45. See supra notes 4-6 & 10 and accompanying text.
46. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 1221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1243 (1996). Section 221(c) of
this Act states that it shall apply retroactively to any cause of action arising before its
date of enactment. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 n.4
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (applying § 1605(a)(7) to state-sponsored acts of terrorism by Cuba
occurring before the effective date of the Act).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999).
48. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-172 (1996), codifiedat 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. V 1999).
This statute provides that an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as
a state sponsor of terrorism shall be liable to a United States national for money damages
for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent while
acting in the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency for which jurisdiction is
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Id. These damages may include economic
damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages. Id. This statute also
overrides any common law doctrine of head of state immunity. See Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 2d I, 24-25 (D.D.C. 1998).
49. By its terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note does not expressly authorize a cause of
action against the foreign state itself. See supra note 48. However, if an agent's liability
is proved under the statute, the foreign state employing the agent may incur liability
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Three conditions must be met in order to bring suit under the state-
sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7). The foreign state
must have been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the
Secretary of State.50 In addition, the plaintiff or the victim must be a
United States national.5' And finally, if the actionable conduct of the
foreign state occurred within that state's territory, then the state must be
offered an opportunity to arbitrate the claim.
52
The FSIA's state-sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7)
therefore differs from the noncommercial tort exception of section
1605(a)(5), in several significant respects. First, section 1605(a)(7) is
limited to United States nationals, plaintiffs or victims, who bring an
action against one of a small number of foreign countries that the
Executive branch has officially designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism. Presently, the countries so designated are Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.53 Second, and most importantly
for jurisdictional purposes, section 1605(a)(7) does not contain a situs
requirement. The language and legislative history reveal clear Congressional
intent that section 1605(a)(7) should apply extraterritorially. 54 Therefore,
section 1605(a)(7) provides the basis for personal jurisdiction over, and
removes the sovereign immunity of, foreign sovereign defendants sued
for materially supporting acts of terrorism committed in foreign countries.
under the theory of respondeat superior. See Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 1249
(entering money judgment against Cuba for terrorist acts committed by Cuban Air Force
in shooting down unarmed airplanes thereby killing United States nationals). See also
Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1426-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding China could
be liable for murder of plaintiff's husband ordered by China's Director of Defense
Intelligence Bureau, under California's law of respondeat superior, in wrongful death
action under noncommercial tort provision of FSIA). But see Roeder v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, - F. Supp. -, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6703 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding
that § 1605 note does not unambiguously create a cause of action against Iran, and
therefore does not provide the type of express statutory mandate sufficient to abrogate
the Algiers Accords, an international executive agreement).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1999). This designation is made pursuant
to either the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (1994), or
Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2000). Id. The
Export Administration Act authorizes the Secretary of State to make a determination that
a foreign state has "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism," to
notify the relevant committees of Congress, and to publish the determination in the
Federal Register. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 24056).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1999).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i).
53. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2000).
54. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
In several recent cases, the lower federal courts have relied on section
1605(a)(7) as the sole statutory authority for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over foreign state defendants alleged to have sponsored acts
of terrorism occurring, and causing injuries, outside the United States.55
These courts have also addressed the more complicated issue of whether
the assertion of jurisdiction in such cases is consistent with the United
States Constitution. This issue is potentially a difficult one because,
unlike the noncommercial tort and commercial activity exceptions
specified in the FSIA, the state-sponsored terrorism exception requires
no nexus between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the territory of
the United States. However, although their reasoning may differ, these
courts have all concluded that their assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state based solely on section 1605(a)(7) is consistent with
the United States Constitution.
In all of these state-sponsored terrorism cases, the courts observe that
the process of obtaining personal jurisdiction under the FSIA does not
follow the traditional approach outlined by the Supreme Court in
56International Shoe with respect to defendants who are private parties.
More specifically, they suggest that an independent finding of
"minimum contacts" may not be constitutionally required for
establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant foreign state when
jurisdiction arises pursuant to section 1605(a)(7).57 These courts do
seem to recognize that the Constitution may limit Congress' power to
authorize jurisdiction over foreign states whose actions have little
connection with the United States, but they find a sufficient nexus with
the United States exists by definition under section 1605(a)(7) based
upon the victim's United States nationality.58 Moreover, in some of
55. E.g., Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 45-51
(D.D.C. 2001); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002);
Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2001); Elahi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 105-08 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-16 (D.D.C. 1998); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97
F. Supp. 2d 39, 52-54 (D.D.C. 2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp.
2d 62, 67-69 (D.D.C. 1998); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107,
113 (D.D.C. 2000); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1247-49 (S.D.
Fla. 1997); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2000).
See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 762-64 (2nd Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
56. E.g., Price, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 14; Rein, 162 F.3d at 761 (dictum); Flatow, 999
F. Supp. at 19-21; Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 52-54.
57. E.g., Rein, 162 F.3d at 761 (observing that the elements of § 1605(a)(7), unlike
those of the commercial activities exception in the FSIA, "do not entail any finding of
minimum contacts."); Price, 110 F. Supp. at 14-15 (same).
58. Price, 110 F. Supp. at 14-15; Eisenfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 7-8; Daliberti, 97 F.
Supp. 2d at 53-54; Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 21-23. The Flatow court observed that "a
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these cases, the courts raise the fundamental question of whether a
foreign state is even a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.59
Whether, or to what extent, the Due Process Clause protects foreign
state defendants is an open question, and an important one in civil
litigation alleging claims of international terrorism. There are many
cogent arguments that support the view that a foreign state is not entitled
the same due process protections as afforded a private person under
International Shoe and its progeny.60  However, because the Supreme
Court has yet to rule squarely on this issue, courts applying section
1605(a)(7) have been hesitant to conclude their constitutional analysis of
personal jurisdiction solely on this basis. 61 As discussed above, several
foreign state that sponsors terrorist activities which causes [sic] the death or personal
injury of a United States national will invariably have sufficient contacts with the United
States to satisfy Due Process." 999 F. Supp. at 23. The Daliberti court also reasoned
that the enactment of § 1605(a)(7) gave state sponsors of terrorism "fair warning," within
the meaning of the due process "minimum contacts" analysis, that terrorist acts against
United States citizens, no matter where they occur, may subject them to suit in a United
States court. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 53-54.
59. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49; Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 19-21; Simpson v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 180 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2001).
60. For analysis of the specific question of whether foreign states are protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment with respect to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, see Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States:
The 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 Va. J.
Int'l L. 369 (2001) (arguing that foreign states and their corporations are not 'persons'
under the Due Process Clause, and that United States courts are not constitutionally
compelled to apply the minimum contacts test when determining personal jurisdiction in
FSIA cases); Joseph W. Glannon and Jeffery Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction:
Suing State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675, 687-96 (1999) (arguing that foreign states
are not "persons" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause). For a general
examination of the protections afforded foreign governments under the Constitution, see
Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 488-89
(1987) (arguing foreign states are not "persons" in the sense that they are entitled to
constitutional protections that would permit courts to diminish the plenary power of
Congress and the President to establish United States policy toward foreign states).
61. Moreover, in stark contrast to these recent federal district court decisions
applying § 1605(a)(7), another line of cases applying the commercial activity exceptions
of the FSIA have concluded "each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA
requires.. .a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its authority over a
particular defendant." Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300, 308 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). See, e.g.,
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) (ruling personal jurisdiction
under the FSIA requires satisfaction of the traditional minimum contacts standard);
Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105-09
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (indicating a due process contacts
courts, even those that have endorsed the view that foreign states are not
entitled to all the protections of constitutional due process guaranteed to
individuals, have nonetheless proceeded under the assumption that the
"minimum contacts" test may apply to foreign state defendants. 62
If the Due Process Clause does require application of the minimum
contacts test in the same manner as applied to private defendants, then
the ability of plaintiffs to utilize the FSIA's state-sponsored terrorism
provisions will be severely restricted with respect to terrorist acts
occurring outside the United States. The conclusion reached by some
courts-that state-sponsored terrorism causing injury to a United States
national overseas supplies the requisite "minimum contacts" with the
United States-would not pass constitutional muster. Under the
Supreme Court's traditional minimum contacts analysis, such terrorist
acts causing injury or death overseas would not constitute purposeful
63activities by the defendant directed at the forum state. Nor is a foreign
country, designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, likely to have
"continuous and systematic" contacts with the United States, even
assuming a national contacts approach is proper and sufficient to satisfy
the due process requirements for general jurisdiction. Consequently,
the issue of whether and to what extent the Due Process Clause protects
foreign state entities, should be settled by the Supreme Court and
resolved in a manner that will uphold the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over such defendants pursuant to section 1605(a)(7), with
respect to claims of state-sponsored terrorism occurring outside the
United States.65
analysis is necessary when jurisdiction based on the FSIA).
62. See cases cited supra note 58. Even the Supreme Court has assumed, without
deciding, that a foreign state is a "person" for purposes of the Due Process Clause, in
finding that a foreign state possessed minimum contacts that would satisfy the
constitutional test. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992)
(upholding personal jurisdiction over Argentina pursuant to the commercial activity
provisions of the FSIA).
63. See supra notes 4-7 & 10 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
65. The Supreme Court has already held States of the Union are not "persons" for
purposes of the Due Process Clause. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-
24 (1966). As the Flatow court astutely observed when concluding that Iran is not a
"person" for purposes of due process analysis, "it would be illogical to grant [personal
jurisdiction protection based on due process] to foreign states when it has not been
granted to federal, state or local governments of the United States." Flatow, 999 F. Supp.
at 19-21. See Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 687-95 (reviewing various authorities
and concluding that, because foreign states are not "persons," the Due Process Clause
does not constrain the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(7)); Caplan,
supra note 60 (same). But see Keith E. Sealing, "State Sponsors of Terrorism" Are
Entitled to Due Process Too: The Amended Sovereign Immunities Act is
Unconstitutional, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 395, 397-98 (2000) (arguing that personal
jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(7), based solely on a terrorist act overseas that has some
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B. Service of Process
1. Service on Private Parties
Service of the complaint and summons on a private party defendant
within the United States is a fairly routine matter. Service becomes
more complicated, however, when it must be effected on a private party
located outside the United States. Many countries view service of
process from a United States court directly on a party located within
their borders as a violation of their sovereignty and of international
law.66 Likewise, another country will not enforce a civil judgment rendered
by a United States court unless service was accomplished in a manner
consistent with that country's laws. 67 However, if a plaintiff only wants
a judgment against a foreign defendant that is considered valid and
enforceable within the United States, service of process presents few
problems.
As with personal jurisdiction, service of process on foreign nationals
is subject to two basic limitations. First, the manner of service must be
authorized by a statute or court rule and, second, must also comply with
the Due Process Clause.68 Under that Clause, foreign nationals are
assured of either personal or substituted service that provides "notice
effect within the United States, violates the Due Process Clause under the minimum
contacts test).
66. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 836 (observing that in some countries
service of process is viewed as a sovereign act and that any attempt to do so directly
from a United States court may be deemed a violation of that country's sovereignty and
subject to sanction); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 774-79 (Kluwer 3rd ed. 1996) (surveying various authorities which
illustrate that many nations object to foreign service of process within their territory on
local nationals as a violation of their sovereignty).
67. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 836 (explaining that use of a service
method not accepted in a foreign country will mean that any United States judgment that
is forthcoming may not be enforced in that country); Gary B. Born & Andrew N.
Vollmer, The Effect of the Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Personal
Jurisdiction, Service, and Discovery in International Cases, 150 F.R.D. 221, 239 (1993)
(noting that a country whose laws were violated by service of United States process
might well not enforce a resulting United States judgment); RONALD A. BRAND,
ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS
ABROAD 26-27 (ABA 1992) (observing that judgments from United States courts often
will be denied recognition and enforcement abroad unless service is through a method
recognized in the enforcing country).
68. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988)
(observing that foreign nationals are not excepted from the protections of the Due
Process Clause).
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprize interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. '69 With one major exception, so long as these
two domestic law requirements are satisfied, service of process will be
considered valid by courts within the United States even though the
manner of service conflicts with another nation's laws or violates
international law.70 The major exception is the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (hereinafter,
the "Hague Service Convention").7 ' The Hague Service Convention is a
multilateral treaty that provides procedures for the service of process on
defendants living in foreign countries. The Convention provides relatively
simple and certain, although somewhat costly and time-consuming,
means by which to serve process on foreign nationals located in another
signatory country.72 The scope of the Convention is extremely broad,
69. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See
Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (upholding constitutionality of substituted service on foreign
corporation by delivery to statutory agent within United States); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d
1086, 1094 (2nd Cir. 1987) (upholding constitutionality of service by publication of
complaint and summons in the International Herald Tribune as reasonably calculated to
notify European defendants whose whereabouts were unknown).
70. See, e.g., Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 32-34 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding
that service by registered mail on defendants located in Switzerland was authorized
under the pre-1993 Federal Rule 4 even though contrary to Swiss law and U.S. State
Department memorandum); SEC v. International Swiss Investments Corp., 895 F.2d
1272 (9th Cir. 1990) (indicating that Rule 4, and not international law, determines the
validity of service on defendant companies who reside in Mexico); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (observing in dicta that
federal courts must give effect to clear Congressional mandate authorizing service, even
if such effect would conflict with another nation's laws or violate international law). But
see FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (f)(2)(A) & (C) (generally not authorizing service of complaint and
summons by methods that violate the law of the country in which the defendant is
located); Umbenhauer, 969 F.2d at 33 (stating in dicta that "[i]f proposed rule 4(f)(2)(C)
were in effect today, then contrary to our holding here the new Rule would preclude a
district court clerk from serving process... in a country whose laws forbid that method
of service.").
71. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature November 15, 1965,
20 U.S.T. 361, ratified by the United States in 1969 [hereinafter Hague Service
Convention].
72. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 698-99 (summarizing the Convention's provisions).
The Hague Service Convention requires each country to establish a "Central Authority"
to receive requests for service of documents from other signatory countries. Hague
Service Convention, art. 2, supra note 71, 20 U.S.T. at 362. Once a Central Authority
receives a request in the proper form, it must serve the documents by a method
prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state or by a method designated by the
requester and compatible with that law. Id. (art. 5). The Central Authority must then
provide a certificate of service that conforms to a specified model. Id. at 363 (art. 6). A
state may also consent to methods of service within its boundaries other than a request to
its central authority. Id. at 363-65 (arts. 8-11, 19). One of these alternative methods, if
the state of destination does not object, provides that the Convention "shall not interfere
with the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons
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applying to civil or commercial matters "where there is occasion to
transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad. 73 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Convention as mandatory and
exclusive in all cases to which it applies and, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause, as therefore preempting inconsistent methods of service prescribed by
state law in such cases. However, the Convention does not define the
circumstances in which there is "occasion to transmit" a complaint "for
service abroad." This definition is provided by reference to the internal
law of the forum state.75
According to the Supreme Court, the Hague Service Convention does
not apply where service of process on a foreign defendant can be
completed within the United States without the necessity of transmittal
of documents for service abroad.76 If service on a foreign defendant is
fully accomplished within the United States, then such service does not
implicate the Convention. Consequently, for example, if a state statute
authorizes service on a foreign defendant by delivery of the complaint
and summons to the defendant's domestic agent within the United
States, there is no need to resort to the Convention's mechanisms for
service abroad.77 This type of substituted service has been successfully
employed where a foreign group sued for supporting terrorist acts, has
an agent-an official spokesperson or fund-raiser for that group-who is
served within the United States.78 Of course, unless somehow immune
abroad." Id. at 363 (art. 10(a)). Although there is some authority otherwise, the majority
view of this provision is that it does not authorize service of the complaint and summons,
as opposed to subsequent documents, directly by mail. See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases and holding that use of
Article 10(a) is limited to sending subsequent documents after service of process has
been properly obtained by other means); Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 861, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
73. Hague Service Convention, art 1, supra note 71, 20 U.S.T. at 362.
74. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 698-99.
75. Id. at 701-05.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 706-08. In Schlunk, the Supreme Court held that the Hague Service
Convention does not apply when process is served on a foreign corporation by serving
domestic subsidiary which, under Illinois state law, is the foreign corporation's
involuntary agent for service of process. According to the Court, "[w]here service on a
domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause,
our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications." Id. at 707.
78. See, e.g., Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87-91
(D.R.I. 2001) (holding delivery of complaint and summons on managing or general
agent of defendants PLO and PA within the United States constituted valid service of
process); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 52-54 (2nd Cir.) (holding
79from service of process, personal service of a complaint and summons
upon an individual defendant while physically present within the United
States always constitutes proper service.8°
Another method of effecting proper service on a private party defendant
located abroad is by publication, at least in cases where the whereabouts
of the foreign defendant cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence.
Because such service is accomplished within the United States, service
by publication does not implicate the Hague Service Convention.
Moreover, by its terms, the Hague Service Convention does not apply
where the address of the person to be served is not known.8' Service by
publication may therefore be an expedient method of service where
foreign defendants, such as individuals and groups accused of terrorist
acts, are in hiding.
82
The Hague Service Convention applies only when a court in one
signatory country seeks to serve process abroad on a defendant located
in another signatory country. As of 2002, the United States and thirty-
five other countries have ratified or acceded to the Hague Service
Convention, including most of our trading partners in Europe and Asia,• 83
as well as Egypt, Israel, and Pakistan. Service abroad on a foreign
that service of process on the PLO's Permanent Observer to the UN may constitute
proper service on the PLO's "managing or general agent" within the meaning of Federal
Rule 4(d)(3)).
79. The Headquarters Agreement provides for immunity from service of process
for certain representatives of members of the United Nations, for certain other persons
while within the "headquarters district" of the U.N., and for persons invited by the U.N.
while in transit to or from the "headquarters district." Agreement Between the United
Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, §§ 9 & 15, 61 Stat 756, (1947), reprinted at 22 U.S.C. § 287 note (1994). See
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247-48 (2nd Cir. 1995), cert denied, 518 U.S. 1005(1996) (upholding personal jurisdiction over defendant Bosnian-Serb official sued for
genocide by Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Alien Tort Act,
if plaintiffs are able to prove that defendant was personally served while he was in New
York outside the U.N. headquarters district).
80. Rule 4(e)(2), F.R.C.P., specifically authorizes personal service of a summons
and complaint upon an individual physically present within a judicial district of the
United States. Pursuant to Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), such
personal service also comports with the requirements of due process for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246-47.
81. Hague Service Convention, art. 1, supra note 71, 20 U.S.T. at 362.
82. See People v. Mendocino County Assessor's Parcel, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 53(Ct. App. 1997) (upholding service by publication on defendant, a resident of Spain,
whose whereabouts are unknown, and holding Hague Service Convention inapplicable);
Kott v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 219-21 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that service
of process by publication in California does not implicate the Hague Service Convention,
but also finding such service invalid because plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable
diligence to learn defendant's address in Canada prior to seeking court permission to
serve by publication, as required by California law).
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 note (Conventions), 28 U.S.C.A. app. (West 2001). The
United States and many of its trading partners in Central and South America have signed
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defendant not located in another signatory country is more problematic and
less certain. Due to the absence of any treaty obligation, a court in a
nonsignatory country is under no duty to assist a United States court to
effect service of process. The traditional method of attempting service
in such circumstances is by a letter rogatory or letter of request.
A letter rogatory, in this context, is simply a letter from a court in the
United States to one in another country, normally delivered through
diplomatic channels, which requests assistance in effecting service of
process upon someone located within that country's borders. The main
problem with such use of letters rogatory is that the receiving court is
under no obligation to comply with the request. 85  Requests for
assistance in serving process addressed to a court in a country unfriendly
to the United States will most likely be ignored. Even when addressed
to a court in a friendly country, such requests may be greeted with
indifference and delay. Consequently, when a defendant resides in a
nonsignatory country, there often is no effective and efficient means of
serving process abroad. In such circumstances, service must be
accomplished via substitute or constructive service within the United
States or in anY other manner that satisfies domestic requirements for
proper service.
a similar multilateral treaties. For example, the Inter-American Convention on Letters
Rogatory, opened for signature, Jan. 30, 1975, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-27, XIII (1984),
1483 U.N.T.S. 288; Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters
Rogatory, opened for signature May 8, 1979, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 98-27, XVIII,
(1984), O.A.S.T.S. No. 56 (OEA/Ser. A/33 (English)). However, unlike the Hague
Service Convention, the Inter-American Treaty may not be mandatory and exclusive.
See Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 647 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1016 (1994) (concluding the Inter-American Convention does not
preempt other methods of service available under state or federal law).
84. For more in-depth discussion of the use of letters rogatory in the context of
service of process, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International
Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L. J. 169, 228-29 (2000); Gary N. Horlick, A Practical
Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14 INT'L LAW 637, 640-42 (1980)
(discussing the practical disadvantages of service abroad pursuant to letters rogatory,
including cumbersome procedures, delay, and noncompliance, but noting that some
countries permit no other form of service from foreign courts); Hans Smit, International
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1019-25 (1965)
(discussing the mechanics of service abroad pursuant to letters rogatory, either through
diplomatic channels or addressed directly to a foreign tribunal).
85. See authorities cited supra note 84.
86. See discussion supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
2. Service on Foreign States
Compared to service on foreign private parties, service on foreign
sovereign entities is relatively straightforward. The FSIA contains
uniform, exclusive service rules applicable in both federal and state
courts.87 Section 1608(a) sets forth a list of four alternative methods by
which service shall be made upon a foreign state or political subdivision
of a foreign state, with specified preferences for the order in which these
alternatives must be attempted. First, service should be made in accordance
with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the
foreign state or, second, in accordance with an applicable international
convention on service of judicial documents.89 If neither of these first
two options are available, then section 1608(a)(3) authorizes service by
mail requiring a signed receipt addressed to the head of the ministry of
foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.
Finally, if service by mail under section 1608(a)(3) cannot be made
within 30 days, section 1608(a)(4) authorizes the clerk of the court to
mail copies of the complaint and summons and a notice of suit, with
translations, to the U.S. Secretary of State for transmittal of the papers
through diplomatic channels to the foreign state. So long as the Department
of State properly transmits these papers as instructed and confirms this
transmittal with the court, service pursuant to section 1608(a)(4) poses
few problems. 90 Indeed, in several recent cases, plaintiffs alleging state-
sponsored terrorism have successfully utilized section 1608(a)(4) to
accomplish service of process upon foreign state defendants. 9' Even
87. Federal Rule 40)(1) provides that "service upon a foreign state or a political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof shall be effected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1608." FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (j)(l).
88. Section 1608(b) contains a somewhat different set of hierarchical alternatives
applicable to service on an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. §
1608(b)(1)-(3) (1994).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(l)-(2) (1994).
90. Service under § 1608(a)(4) is deemed to have been made as of the date of
transmittal indicated in the certified copy of the diplomatic note. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(c)(1)
(1994).
91. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6 n.1 (D.D.C.
1998) (entering default judgment against defendant Iran and noting that, despite Iran's
apparent attempt to evade service by international registered mail pursuant to §
1608(a)(3), "service was accomplished with the assistance of the Swiss Embassy in
Tehran."); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that
defendant Iraq was served via the U.S. Interests Section of the Polish Embassy in
Baghdad); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 n.4 (D.D.C. 1998)
(noting that service was properly "effected through the Embassy of Switzerland in
Tehran, which delivered the summons, complaint, and notice of suit to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Iran" pursuant to § 1608(a)(4)); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 n.1 (D.D.C. 2000) (same); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (same).
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assuming that the same Due Process Clause protections apply to foreign
states as apply to private parties, the manner of service authorized by the
FSIA would certainly constitute notice "reasonably calculated" to notify
foreign sovereign defendants.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Venue, and Forum Non Conveniens
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A victim of terrorism who wishes to bring suit in U.S. District Court
should have little difficulty in finding statutory authority for federal
subject matter jurisdiction. If the plaintiff is a citizen of a State and the
defendants are citizens of a foreign country, the district court will have
alienage jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a)(2) as to state law
claims, and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 as
to federal claims.92
In addition to general federal question jurisdiction, several special
statutes authorize the district courts to hear federal claims against foreign
defendants who have allegedly committed terrorist acts. The
Antiterrorism Act of 1991, for example, provides that any United States
national injured in his person or property by reason of an act of
international terrorism may sue in federal district court for recovery of
threefold the damages sustained.93 The district court may also exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims arising from the
same terrorist conduct, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367. 94
With respect to claims of terrorism against foreign sovereign entities,
the FSIA provides the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. As
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994) (referring to the
Torture Victim Protection Act), an alien plaintiff can bring a civil action for damages
against another individual who, "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign country," subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing. See Kadic
v. Karadizic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2nd Cir. 1996) (suggesting federal jurisdiction exists
under § 1331 as to claims authorized by the Torture Victim Act).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000). The federal district courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over such actions brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991. 18 U.S.C. §
2338 (2000). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003-04 (N.D.
Il. 2001) (ruling subject matter jurisdiction conferred by § 2333 and § 2338 with respect
to plaintiffs' claims against defendant organizations for allegedly providing material
support to Hamas terrorists who killed plaintiffs' son in terrorist shooting in Israel).
94. See Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.R.I.
2001) (asserting supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against PLO and other
defendants arising from killings in Israel by terrorist group Hamas).
discussed previously, when one of the specified exceptions to sovereign
immunity applies, the FSIA simultaneously confers both subject matter
and personal jurisdiction upon the federal district courts.95 The FSIA
does not preclude state courts from hearing claims against foreign
sovereigns. 96  However, the FSIA does encourage a foreign state
defendant to remove to federal court in order to avoid a jury trial.97
Although most of the jurisdictional determinations are straightforward, one
interesting issue has been raised regarding the constitutionality of federal
subject matter jurisdiction under the state-sponsored terrorism provisions
of the FSIA. In a recent case, a foreign state defendant, Libya, entered
an appearance and argued that by allowing the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction to depend on the State Department's determinations
of whether particular foreign states are sponsors of terrorism, section
1605(a)(7) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.98 The court rejected this argument on the ground that there was
no delegation of power. Because Libya was already on the list of state
sponsors of terrorism when section 1605(a)(7) was passed by Congress,
no decision whatsoever b 9 the Secretary of State was needed to create
jurisdiction as to Libya. However, the court noted the issue of
delegation might be presented if another foreign sovereign-one not
identified as a state sponsor of terrorism when section 1605(a)(7) was
passed-was placed on the list by the State Department and, on being
sued in federal court, interposed the defense that Libya raised. 100 Even
as to this hypothetical, the court indicated that such delegation by
Congress would be constitutionally sound.10'
95. See authorities cited supra notes 36-39. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1994),
federal district courts are provided with subject matter jurisdiction if a foreign state is
"not entitled to immunity ... under §§ 1605-1607." In cases where the plaintiff alleges
only state law claims, § 1330(a) is authorized by Article III's "minimal diversity"
requirement where at least one of the plaintiffs is a citizen of a State, and by Article III's
"arising under" jurisdiction where all of the parties are foreign. See Verlinden v. Central
Bank of Niger., 461 U.S. 480, 481 (1983).
96. See In re Estate of Weinstein, 712 N.Y.S. 2d 300, 302 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2000)(holding that, because a state court has jurisdiction to hear FSIA claims, New York state
court has jurisdiction to grant limited letters of administration where sole asset of estate
is cause of action against Syria pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) of FSIA).
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
98. Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 763-64 (2nd
Cir. 1998). This same issue was raised by defendant, Iraq, in another case wherejurisdiction was based on § 1605(a)(7). Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38,
49-52 (D.D.C. 2000).
99. Rein, 162 F.3d at 764.
100. Id. The Rein court also noted that this federal subject matter jurisdiction issue
might also arise if a state on the list when § 1605(a)(7) was enacted is later dropped from
the list, in which case a plaintiff could raise the argument of unduly delegated authority.
Id.
101. Rein, 162 F.3d at 763-64 (dictum). Relying on an old Supreme Court case,
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2. Venue
The venue restrictions for civil actions against foreign defendants in
federal court are insignificant. With respect to private parties generally,
the Alien Venue Statute provides that "[a]n alien may be sued in any
district."'' 0 2  More specifically with respect to treble damage actions
brought under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, venue is proper in "any
district where any plaintiff resides or where any defendant resides or is
served, or has an agent."' 103 The FSIA provides somewhat more limited
choices of venue where the defendant is a foreign sovereign entity, but
these include any district in which a substantial part of the events giving
rise to the claim occurred, or in which an agency or instrumentality is
doing business, or in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
if the action is brought against a foreign state or its political subdivision.'04
3. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a trial court to dismiss
a case where an alternative forum is available in another country that is
fair to the parties and substantially more convenient for them or the
courts. 10 5  In commercial tort litigation, this is an important tool for
defendants who wish to remove a products liability action from a court
in the United States to one in a foreign country whose substantive and
procedural laws, including the lack of jury trial and punitive damages,
are far more favorable to the defendant.1 6 However, for a variety of
Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), and one of its own recent precedents,
Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 1997), the Rein court opined that
such delegation by Congress to the Secretary of State would be constitutionally
permissible. Id. The Daliberti court followed Rein's reasoning and concluded there was
no separation of powers violation when Congress vested jurisdiction in the federal courts
over a class of sovereigns identified as terrorist states and delegated that determination to
the Secretary of State. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 50-52.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1994).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (2000). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp.
2d 1002, 1034 (N.D. I11. 2001) (ruling venue proper in Northern District of Illinois
pursuant to § 2334(a) with respect to terrorist acts that occurred in Israel where one
defendant, the U.S. based leader of military branch of Hamas, resides).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1994).
105. Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 719 (1 st Cir. 1996).
106. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (upholding
dismissal of products liability action against defendants, two U.S. manufacturers, on
grounds that Scotland was a more convenient forum, even though a Scottish court would
not provide a jury trial and would apply liability and damages law less favorable to
reasons, foreign defendants will not likely find this doctrine as helpful in
actions seeking damages for acts of international terrorism.
Under the federal common law doctrine, which is similar to the
approach utilized in most state courts, there is a strong presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, particularly where the plaintiff is
a resident of the forum. 10 7 The defendant must first demonstrate that an
adequate alternative forum exists, and then that considerations of
convenience and judicial efficiency strongly favor litigating the claim in
the alternative forum.10 8 In general, the threshold requirement is usually
satisfied if the defendant shows that an alternative forum provides some
redress for the type of claims alleged in the plaintiff s complaint and that
the defendant is amenable to suit in the alternative forum.1°9 The
possibility of an unfavorable change in the substantive or procedural law
is ordinarily not a relevant consideration, unless the remedy provided by
the alternative forum is "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is
no remedy at all." 10 If a suitable alternative forum exists, then the
defendant must demonstrate that the balance of various relevant private
and public interest factors strongly favor dismissal."' The trial court has
the discretion to grant or deny a forum non conveniens motion based on
its consideration of these relevant factors." 
2
A trial court is unlikely to grant a forum non conveniens dismissal
where the plaintiff, a victim of terrorism abroad, is a resident of the
United States and the alternative forum is located in a country overtly
hostile to the United States. If the terrorist acts occurred in the United
plaintiffs); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987) (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal
of mass tort class action even though Indian legal system has limited pre-trial discovery,
back log of tort cases, less developed tort law, and no right to jury trial).
107. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56 (recognizing that there is ordinarily a strong
presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum, but holding that a foreign
plaintiffs choice deserves less deference than the choice of a resident); Stangvik v.
Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 20 (Cal. 1991) (same); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467
N.E. 2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1984) (same).
108. Iragorri v. International Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000); Estates
of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 99 (D.R.I. 2001); Stangvik, 819
P.2d at 17-19. But see Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d at 248-51 (observing that the availability of
another suitable forum is a most important factor, but not a prerequisite for applying
forum non conveniens).
109. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
110. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 19.
Ill. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (identifying an
illustrative list of considerations relevant to the private and public interests); Iragorri,
203 F.3d at 15-18; Piper, 454 U.S. at 241, 257-61; Stangvik, 54 Cal. 3d at 756-64, 819
P.2d at 22-27 (applying various private and public interest factors); Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d
at 249-50 (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal where no substantial nexus
between New York and Iran's cause of action against its former ruler).
112. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17; Pahlavi, 467 N.E. 2d at 247.
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States, dismissal is unlikely even if the traditional private and public
interest factors are considered in the same manner as in commercial tort
litigation. Under traditional forum non conveniens analysis, one of the
relevant public interest factors is the forum state's interest in deterring
wrongful conduct by the defendant in the forum state.'1 3 If the court
emphasizes this interest, a likely scenario in an action involving
terrorism, the motion will most certainly be denied. This interest would
likely outweigh all other private and public interest in an action against
foreign defendants alleged to have engaged in terrorist acts within the
forum state.
Different considerations apply when the plaintiff's action seeks treble
damages under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. section 2333,
for injuries caused by international terrorism. This Act limits the
circumstances under which the district court can entertain a forum non
conveniens motion in such an action. One such statutory limitation is
that the district court shall not dismiss "unless the foreign court offers a
remedy which is substantially the same as the one available in the courts
of the United States."'1 4  This prerequisite would seem to preclude
dismissal where the substantive law or the law of damages applicable in
the alternative forum is substantially less favorable to the plaintiff than
that applied in the district court; a likely scenario in most cases seeking
treble damages under the Act for international terrorism. Consequently,
the inclusion of a claim under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 would so
reduce the prospects of a forum non conveniens dismissal as to render
the motion almost meaningless.
D. Choice-of-Law, Jurisdiction to Prescribe, and the
Act of State Doctrine
1. Choice-of-Law
Claims based on terrorist acts occurring overseas may involve choice-
of-law issues. The facts of Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority' 15
illustrate how such issues may arise. Yaron Ungar, a United States
citizen, and his wife were killed in Israel by the terrorist group Hamas.
113. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 260-61; Stangvik, 819 P,2d at 22-23 (considering
whether California's interest in deterring wrongful conduct justified retention of
plaintiffs' actions in a California court).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2334(d)(3) (2000).
115. Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001).
The Ungars' estate and children subsequently filed an action in the U.S.
District Court for Rhode Island against the Palestine Liberation Organization
and other nonsovereign foreign defendants, seeking damages under state
tort law and the federal Antiterrorism Act of 1991. In ruling on the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district
court correctly recognized that it must determine whether the substantive
law of Rhode Island or of Israel governed the state law tort claims. As
required by the Erie doctrine, the district court then applied Rhode
Island's choice-of-law doctrine, an "interest-weighing" approach, and
determined that Israeli law governed the tort claims alleged in the
complaint."16 Although the result may be different under other state
doctrines and factual circumstances, such choice-of-law determinations
are necessary in international terrorism litigation whenever state law
claims are alleged against private parties." 7
A somewhat similar determination may be necessary under the FSIA
when terrorism claims are alleged against sovereign entities. The FSIA
does not contain any federal standards of substantive liability. Instead,
under section 1606 of the FSIA, a foreign state not entitled to immunity
"shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances."'" 18 There is a split of authority as
to whether state or federal choice-of-law doctrine determines the
relevant substantive law under section 1606, and as to the nature of the
substantive law so chosen.
Cases that have considered choice-of-law issues in the context of the
FSIA's commercial activities exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity
have applied state rules of decision, including state choice-of-law
doctrine. 19  However, cases brought pursuant to the state-sponsored
116. Id. at 98-99.
117. Of course, no such choice-of-law determination is necessary when the cause of
action is based on federal laws, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note or the Antiterrorism Act
of 1991, 18 U.S.C. § 2333. See Estates of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97 (construing §
2333 and § 2331 to determine whether plaintiffs stated claims against PLO for terrorist
acts occurring in Israel); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1010-19
(N.D. I11. 2001) (construing § 2333 and related federal statutes to determine whether
plaintiff properly stated a claim against various defendants for providing material
support to Hamas for acts of terrorism in Israel).
118. 28U.S.C.§ 1606 (1994).
119. E.g., Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation, 923 F.2d 957 (2nd Cir.
1991) (holding New York choice-of-law doctrine applies to wrongful death claims
brought under § 1605(a)(2) to ensure that defendant, Chinese agency, is liable in the
same manner as a private individual as specified by § 1606 of FSIA, and under that
doctrine that the $20,000 damage limit of Chinese law applies to plaintiffs' wrongful
death claims); Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 678 (D. N.J. 1992) (applying
state choice-of-law rules and concluding that New Jersey law governs most of the
substantive issues). See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C.
1998) (collecting cases).
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terrorism provisions of section 1605(a)(7) have adopted a different approach.
These cases have applied federal common law, to both the determination
of liability and of appropriate damages, after a federal choice-of-law
analysis.1 20 The justification for this application of federal law common
law is not always made clear. However, one district court reasoned that
when Congress created jurisdiction and a cause of action for personal
injury resulting from state-sponsored terrorism, including its own statute
of limitations, it intended the courts to develop national standards to
promote uniform determinations of liability of foreign states for such
terrorist acts. 12 1 This court interpreted the jurisdictional amendments to
the FSIA contained in section 1605(a)(7) and the related cause of action
against foreign states created by section 1605(a) note in para materia.122
This reasoning lead the court to employ interstitial federal common law
to determine substantive issues regarding claims of state-sponsored
terrorism where it might otherwise have relied upon state law.
12 3
These uses of federal common law do appear appropriate for section
1605 note claims heard pursuant to section 1605(a)(7), even though
clearly not appropriate for state law claims heard pursuant to the FSIA's
commercial activity exceptions to immunity from suit. The jurisprudence
evolving from the federal district courts endorses this approach when
determining liability and damages against state sponsors of terrorism.1
2 4
Unless a case proceeds to the merits by way of a contested trial, the
appellate courts may have little opportunity to weigh in on the propriety
of using federal common law, as opposed to state law, as the choice-of-
120. E.g., Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 14-16 (employing interstitial federal common law
as the rule of decision under the state-sponsored terrorism exception); Wagner v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134-35 (D.D.C. 2001) (applying a federal choice-
of-law rule based on the Second Restatement of Conflicts, and concluding federal
common law also applies to calculate the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled in their
FSIA case); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 47-53 (applying
federal common law notions of battery, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of mental distress); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F. Supp. 2d 36, 46 (D.D.C.
2001) (observing that federal common law, rather than the law of any foreign or
domestic state, should govern in circumstances to which the FSIA does not speak). See
also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S.
1058 (1990) (applying federal choice-of-law rule to claims brought pursuant to FSIA's
noncommercial tort provisions). These cases stress that the liability determination is
separate and distinct from the immunity determination.
121. Flatlow, 999 F. Supp. at 14-15.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See cases cited supra notes 120-23.
law doctrine and the rule of decision with respect to claims alleging
state-sponsored terrorism under the FSIA.
2. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
A different type of choice-of-law inquiry, sometimes referred to as
jurisdiction to prescribe, is required when the plaintiff alleges that
conduct which occurred outside the territory of the United States is
prescribed by a federal statute. Whether such extraterritorial application
of United States law is appropriate is largely a matter of statutory
construction. Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact
laws applicable beyond the territorial boundaries of the Untied States. 121
However, a long-standing canon of statutory construction provides that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 126 This
general presumption can be overridden only by a clear expression of
Congress that extraterritorial application of a federal statute is intended. 27
The prescriptive jurisdiction issue is relevant to federal claims alleged
against private parties under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C.
section 2333; and against sovereign entities for state-sponsored terrorism
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. section 1605(a)(7). The language of the Antiterrorism Act of
1991,128 and the language and legislative history of section 1605(a)(7) of
the FSIA, reveal Congress' clear intent that both federal statutes apply to
extraterritorial conduct. 129  Therefore, these federal statutes properly
125. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-61 (1991)
(observing that the parties must concede "that Congress has the authority to enforce its
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and
observing that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld Congress' power to make laws
applicable to persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries where United States
interests are affected).
126. See Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 248.
127. Id.
128. The Antiterrorism Act provides a federal cause of action for treble damages for
any national of the United States injured by an act of international terrorism. 18 U.S.C. §
2333(a) (2000). That Act defines "international terrorism" as violent activities that
"occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. §
2331(1) (2000).
129. Although the language of the 1996 state-sponsored terrorism amendments to
the FSIA is not as explicit as that of the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, it indirectly indicates
extraterritorial intent. Section 1605(a)(7)(B)(i), which requires the plaintiff to offer the
foreign state an opportunity to arbitrate the claim "if the act occurred in the foreign
state," would be superfluous if Congress did not intend for § 1605(a)(7) to apply to
extraterritorial conduct. Moreover, the legislative history demonstrates a clear
Congressional intent that § 1605(a)(7) applies to extraterritorial conduct and an express
purpose to effect the conduct of terrorists outside the United States, in order to promote
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apply to terrorist conduct occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.
3. The Act of State Doctrine
The Act of State Doctrine generally precludes United States courts
from reviewing the validity of official action by a foreign state
performed within its own territory.' 30 The doctrine is a substantive rule
of decision created by federal common law, and is therefore applicable
in both federal and state courts.' 3' Although its precise contours are
unclear, for a variety of reasons this doctrine should not play a
significant role in litigation alleging state-sponsored terrorism. 132 One
reason is that the doctrine has a situs requirement which makes its
protections inapplicable unless the official action came to complete
fruition within the foreign state. 133 Therefore, the act of state defense
may not apply to terrorist acts sponsored by foreign sovereigns, ordered
and committed within the United States or a third country.'
3
the safety of U.S. citizens traveling overseas. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
999 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1998) (examining the legislative history of § 1605(a)(7) and
concluding it applies to extraterritorial terrorism).
130. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
131. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28.
132. The classic use of the Act of State Doctrine is in cases challenging the validity
of expropriation of private property by a foreign state. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (applying Act of State Doctrine in an action to recover proceeds after Cuba
expropriated certain sugar properties owned by United States nationals); Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (applying Act of State
Doctrine in action by former private owners to recover damages after Cuba nationalized
Cuban cigar manufacturing companies). It has been applied in other contexts as well,
such as an action seeking damages for wrongful imprisonment during a coup in
Venezuela in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); and therefore may be
relevant to cases alleging state-sponsored terrorism.
133. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Braka v. Bancomer, 762 F.2d 222 (2nd Cir. 1985);
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of
State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1, 62-67 (1990) (collecting cases which indicate Act of
State Doctrine protects only sovereign acts of a foreign state taken within that state's
territory); Daniel C. K. Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in
Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987) (discussing the
territorial limitation of the traditional Act of State Doctrine and arguing for a new
approach such that the doctrine would apply only where a sovereign acts within its
legitimate sphere of law making competence and not in violation of international law).
134. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990) (observing that because the court is asked to judge the
legality of the assassination of an American citizen by foreign officials within the United
States, such an inquiry would hardly affront the sovereignty of the foreign nation). See
Even in cases where the complained of terrorist acts occurred within
the foreign state's territory, such acts may not invoke the Act of State
Doctrine. Several lower federal courts have concluded that such terrorist
acts simply do not constitute valid "acts of state" within the meaning of
the doctrine.' 35 Others have reasoned that the doctrine is inconsistent
with, and therefore superceded by, the state-sponsored terrorism exceptions to
immunity from suit explicitly authorized by the FSIA. 136 This reasoning
seems fundamentally sound. Because the Act of State Doctrine is a
creature of federal common law designed to prevent courts from
interfering with the foreign affairs powers of the President and the
Congress, it should not prohibit Congress and the Executive from
authorizing the courts to vindicate such powers. 138 Moreover, if the Act
of State Doctrine exists solely as a rule of federal common law and not
as a constitutional limitation on judicial powers, Congress certainly has
the power to override the doctrine in the FSIA, as it has in other
statutes. 139
also Fletcher Alford, Note, When Nations Kill: The Liu Case and the Act of State
Doctrine in Wrongful Death Suits, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 465 (1989)
(arguing the Act of State Doctrine should not apply to alleged extraterritorial and
intentional tortuous misconduct by a foreign government).
135. E.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 24 (D.D.C. 1998)
(concluding the act of state defense does not apply to bus bombings and other acts of
international terrorism); Liu, 892 F.2d at 1432-34 (holding that political assassinations
ordered by foreign states outside their territory are not valid acts of state within the
meaning of the doctrine); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673-74
(D.D.C. 1980) (same). See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under
the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 242-47 (1983) (reviewing
authorities and arguing that the Act of State Doctrine should be inapplicable to terrorist
acts in violation of international law).
136. See, e.g., Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2000)
(observing that the Act of State Doctrine does not prohibit Congress and the Executive
from authorizing claims against a foreign country designated as a terrorist state);
Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 674; Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 24. See also Michael J. Brazyler,
Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 377 (1986) (arguing that
application of the Act of State Doctrine to the non-immune activities of a foreign state
would frustrate the purposes of the FSIA).
137. According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine is rooted in the "domestic
separation of powers, reflecting 'the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its
engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder' the
conduct of foreign affairs." W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423).
138. Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 55. But see International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (holding the FSIA does not supercede Act of State
Doctrine in cases brought under FSIA's commercial activities exceptions to immunity
from suit); Liu, 892 F.2d at 1432 (ruling the FSIA's noncommercial tort exception does
not supercede the Act of State Doctrine because that doctrine addresses different
concerns than sovereign immunity).
139. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (providing that judicial confirmation and
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Nearly all the cases commenced in the United States courts against
defendants accused of international terrorism have proceeded to the
merits by way of default. 140 As a consequence, few appeals have been
taken and the federal circuit courts have not addressed many of the
procedural issues discussed in this Article. However, the federal district
courts have entered default judgments accompanied by detailed findings
of facts and conclusions of law, often after evidentiary hearings that
resemble non-jury trials, albeit one-sided trials.141 This procedure is
enforcement of arbitral awards "shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State
Doctrine."); Section 302(a)(6) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785,
reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 6021 note (Supp. 1999) (providing that no court shall decline,
based on the Act of State Doctrine, to determine merits of claim by former owner against
defendant who illegally traffics in property confiscated by Cuba).
140. Libya, Iraq and the PLO are some of the few defendants to enter an appearance
and contest actions alleging international terrorism. E.g., Rein v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 755 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003
(1999) (reviewing denial of defendant Libya's motions, including motion to dismiss for
failure to state claim); Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (denying defendant Iraq's various
motions to dismiss); Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 84-85
(D.R.I. 2001) (determining motions to dismiss, including for failure to state a claim, filed
by defendants Palestinian Authority and PLO).
141. E.g., Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-11 (D.D.C.
2000) (entering default judgment after a three-day bench trial, issuing detailed findings
of fact and conclusions of law based on sworn testimony and documents entered into
evidence in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, and finding facts by clear
and convincing evidence which would have been sufficient to establish a prima facie
case in a contested proceeding); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239,
1242-54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (entering a default judgment against Cuba accompanied by a
12-page opinion after receiving evidence on the issues of liability and damages during a
three-day trial); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2001)
(conducting five-day evidentiary hearing, supplemented by declarations under oath,
before entering default judgment against Iraq); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
184 F. Supp. 2d 13, (D.D.C. 2002) (entering default judgment against Iran along with
findings of fact based on sworn testimony entered into evidence during two-day bench
trial); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980) (issuing detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law after evidentiary hearing where plaintiffs
required by the FSIA when the defaulting defendant is a foreign
sovereign entity, 42 and is essential to the legitimacy and perceived
fairness of any domestic judicial decision in the international arena.
2. Civil Remedies
The full range of traditional civil remedies, including compensatory
and punitive damages, are available to plaintiffs who are victims of
international terrorism committed by private parties. In addition, the
Antiterrorism Act of 1991 authorizes recovery of treble damages, costs
and attorney fees, for any United States national injured by an act of
international terrorism. 143 The range is only slightly more limited when
the defendant is a foreign sovereign entity.' The FSIA generally
provides that a foreign sovereign shall be liable "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.' '145 In
addition, the FSIA specifically permits plaintiffs suing under the state-
sponsored terrorism provision in section 1605(a)(7) to recover money
damages which may include "economic damages, solatium, pain, and
suffering.'' 146  However, the current version of the FSIA exempts a
foreign state from liability for punitive damages, although not the
"agency or instrumentality" by which that state commits acts of
terrorism. 47 Pursuant to these FSIA provisions, courts have awarded
plaintiffs hundreds of millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive
damages in international terrorism cases against foreign sovereign
introduced 160 exhibits in support of default judgment under FSIA, including transcripts
of sworn testimony in related criminal proceedings).
142. The FSIA requires that a default against a foreign state, or a political sub-
division or agency or instrumentality thereof, be entered only after the plaintiff
"establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court." 28
U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000). Section 2333 does not apply to a foreign state or
agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or agency thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2000).
144. However, the provisional remedy of prejudgment attachment is much more
limited with respect to assets of a foreign state as opposed to those of a private party.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1994) (authorizing prejudgment attachment of property of a
foreign state used for commercial activity within the United States only if the foreign
state explicitly waived its immunity from such attachment).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. V 1999).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. V 1999).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. V 1999), as amended by the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(f)(2), 114 Stat. 1543
(2000) (repealing recent amendments to § 1606 that had permitted punitive damages
against a foreign state in actions under § 1605(a)(7)). The FSIA defines an "agency or
instrumentality" to include a separate legal entity which is an organ of, or any entity a
majority of whose stock or other ownership interest is owned by, a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
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B. Enforcement of Judgments
1. Enforcement Within the United States
Enforcement of a money judgment rendered in one State of the United
States against a private party in another State poses few procedural
problems. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 149 a valid and final
judgment of one state must be recognized in all other states5 °O Of
course, enforcement of a money judgment in any state is subject to an
overriding practical limitation-the defendant may not have any assets
148. E.g., Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, - F. Supp. 2d _, 2002 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 7440 (D.D.C. 2002) (awarding plaintiffs $21.4 million in compensating damages
against Iran, and $300 million in punitive damages against Iranian agency); Eisenfeld v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-11 (D.D.C. 2000) (awarding plaintiffs
$24.66 million for wrongful death, pain and suffering, and solatium against Iran and
$300,000 punitive damages against Iranian agencies and officials); Wagner v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135-38 (D.D.C. 2001) (awarding plaintiffs $16.3
million for wrongful death economic losses and solatium against Iran and $300 million
punitive damages against Iranian agency); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F. Supp. 2d 36,
47-49 (D.D.C. 2001) (awarding plaintiffs $9.11 million compensatory damages against
Iraq and $300 million punitive damages against Saddam Hussein); Sutherland v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 51-53 (D.D.C. 2001) (awarding compensatory
damages of $53 million against Iran and punitive damages of $300 million against
Iranian agency); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, (D.D.C.
2002) (entering judgment for $33.25 million in compensatory damages against Iran and
$150 million punitive damages against Iranian agency); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 109-15 (D.D.C. 2000) ($11.74 million compensatory against
Iran and $300 million punitive damages against Iranian agency); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 27-34 (D.D.C. 1998) ($22.5 million compensatory and
$225 punitive damages against Iran and Iranian officials); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69-70 (D.D.C. 1998) ($65 million compensatory damages
against Iran); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112-14 (D.D.C.
2000) ($24.5 million compensatory and $300 million punitive against Iran); Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249-54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (awarding $49.9 million
compensatory damages against Cuba and $137.7 punitive damages against Cuban Air
Force); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 37-40 (D.D.C. 2001)
(awarding plaintiffs $14.64 million compensatory damages against Iran and $300 million
punitive damages against Iranian agency); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp.
259, 266-68 (D.D.C. 1980) (entering wrongful death judgment against Chilean officials
of $2.95 million compensatory and $2 million punitive damages).
149. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 1.
150. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)
(requiring federal courts to give full faith and credit to state court judgments). A valid
judgment in this context means that the rendering court properly exercised subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, and provided the defendant with proper notice. See
Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237.
within the jurisdiction that can be reached to satisfy the judgment. This
practical limitation likely constitutes an insurmountable barrier to
collection of money judgments against private individuals who have
committed acts of international terrorism. As to terrorist organizations,
the prospects for enforcement may not be as bleak. For example, if the
organization raises funds or owns property within the United States,
such assets may be attached to satisfy the judgment.15 1  Moreover,
because a civil judgment typically remains effective for several years,
the plaintiff can seek to enforce it whenever the organization obtains
assets in the future.
Enforcement of a money judgment against a foreign sovereign is
governed by the FSIA and related federal statutes. Property of a foreign
state entity within the United States is immune from attachment and
execution unless one of the FSIA's exceptions provide otherwise. 52
Where the judgment is based on the commercial activity or
noncommercial tort exceptions of the FSIA, the property subject to
execution is rather limited. A judgment creditor is permitted to execute
on property of a foreign state "used for a commercial activity in the
United States" only if the property was used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based.153 If the judgment is pursuant to the state-
sponsored terrorism provisions of section 1605(a)(7), however, such
commercial property of a foreign state is not immune from execution
regardless of whether the property was involved with the act upon which
the claim is based. 54  However, the property must be that of the
defendant foreign state and not that of a separate and distinct juridical
entity. 5
5
151. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. I11. 2001)
(describing the fundraising activities of the terrorist organization Hamas in North
America and Western Europe). The Executive branch has authority to freeze all assets
subject to United States jurisdiction of any organization designated a "foreign terrorist
organization" as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (2000). See
Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 n.2. Moreover, by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 2333, domestic
organizations that raise funds within the United States and knowingly provide material
support to foreign terrorist organizations may be civilly liable for aiding and abetting
terrorism. Id. at 1014-21.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1994).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1994).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999).
155. E.g., Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d
1277 (11 th Cir. 1999) (concluding Cuban telecommunications company is a juridical
entity separate from the Cuban government and therefore reversing district court's order
which had permitted plaintiffs to collect portion of their money judgments against Cuba,
obtained under § 1605(a)(7), by garnishing certain debts owed to this telecommunications
company); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2nd Cir. 1984) (concluding that,
under the FSIA, the separate juridical existence of the Chilean National Airline makes its
assets immune from execution to satisfy a judgment against Chile). See First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (recognizing
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The FSIA is somewhat less restrictive with respect to enforcement of
judgments against an "agency or instrumentality"'' 56 of a foreign state
engaged in commercial activity in the United States. If the judgment
relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune
under an FSIA exception, then the judgment creditor may execute on
any property of the agency or instrumentality in the United States
regardless of whether the property was involved in the act upon which
the claim is based. 157 Recognizing these limitations may preclude any
effective remedy for judgment creditors who are victims of state-
sponsored terrorism, Congress amended the FSIA in 1998 to make
additional property subject to execution in cases where the judgment is
based on the state-sponsored terrorism exception of section
1605(a)(7).158 This included certain frozen assets of foreign states and
properties used for diplomatic purposes that were previously immune
from execution. 159 However, pursuant to the express authority to do so
contained in section 1610(f)(3), the President waived the attachment
provisions related to blocked property of terrorist states. 160 Moreover,
section 1611 of the FSIA continues to exempt from execution currency
reserve accounts of a foreign state on deposit within the United States
under the FSIA that "government instrumentalities established as juridical entities
distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such" but
concluding the presumption of separateness was overcome as to Cuban Foreign Trade
Bank and Cuba).
156. The FSIA defines an "agency or instrumentality" to include a separate legal
entity which is an organ of, or any entity a majority of whose stock or other ownership
interest is owned by, a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. 28 U.S.C. §
1603(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (Supp. V 1999). This provision also applies to such
property of an agency or instrumentality where the judgment is based on the state-
sponsored terrorism exception of section 1605(a)(7). 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2).
158. For an excellent summary of these various FSIA amendments expanding the
exceptions to immunity from attachment and execution, as well as the difficulties
encountered by the plaintiffs seeking to enforce their judgments in the Flatow and
Alejandre lawsuits that preceded these amendments, see Comment, Hell-Bent on
Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims: The Evolution and Application of the
Antiterrorism Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L.
213 (2000).
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
160. Presidential Determination No. 01-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (October 28, 2000)
and Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998), reprinted
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610 note (West 2001). This waiver explains that the attachment and
execution provisions of section 1610(f)(1) "would impede the ability of the President to
conduct foreign policy in the interest of national security." Id.
and certain military property.161
Congress subsequently revisited these enforcement restrictions, and
again amended the FSIA by enacting the Justice for Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, to provide new options
for payment of some money judgment directly from the United States
Treasury Department.162  Under this compensation scheme, certain
plaintiffs who obtained judgments against Iran or Cuba (but not one of
the other designated terrorist states) under the state-sponsored terrorism
provisions of section 1605(a)(7) have the option of receiving payments
in the amount of 100 percent or 110 percent of the compensatory
damages awarded in the judgment.163 In order to obtain 100 percent, the
judgment creditor must agree to relinquish all claims and rights to
compensatory damages under the judgment. To obtain 110 percent,
the judgment creditor must also relinquish all rights and claims to
punitive damages awarded by the court. This compensation scheme
remains in effect today, and has resulted in payments to judgment
creditors of Iran and Cuba in amounts that now apparently total over
$250 million. 1
66
Funding for these payments, as to judgments against Cuba, is to be
secured from liquidation of certain blocked assets of the Cuban
government and of certain judicially sanctioned entities.167  As to
judgments against Iran, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to make
payments from rental proceeds of Iranian diplomatic and consular
properties located in the United States, and from amounts obtained
through liquidation of certain frozen assets. 16  With respect to some
sources of these payments, the United States is subrogated, to the extent
of the payments, to all rights of the person paid against the debtor
foreign state. 169 And specifically as to Iran, the Act provides that the
President shall not release any blocked assets to Iran "until such
subrogated claims have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the United
States."' 170 Moreover, the Act expresses the "sense of the Congress" that
the President "should not normalize relations between the United States
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(Supp. 1996).
162. This amendment to the FSIA is part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1542-43 (2000).
163. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 2002(a).
164. Id. at § 2002(a)(2)(B).
165. Id. at § 2002(a)(2)(C).
166. See Bill Miller, Terrorism Victims Set Precedent, U.S. to Pay Damages,
Collect from Iran, WASH POST, Oct. 22, 2000, at Al.
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and Iran until the claims subroated have been dealt with to the
satisfaction of the United States. Needless to say, these statutory
limitations on rapprochement with Iran are viewed by some as
unnecessary interference with the President's ability to conduct foreign
policy. 172
2. Enforcement Outside the United States
There is no international Full Faith and Credit Clause. Absent a
treaty, a country is under no obligation to recognize or enforce
judgments rendered by the courts of other countries.173 At present, the
United States is not a signatory to any treaty that would require another
country to recognize and enforce our civil judgments. 174 Each country is
therefore free to apply whatever standards it wishes when asked, as a
matter of "comity," to recognize and enforce a United States judgment.
Countries hostile to the United States, such as those identified as state
sponsors of terrorism, may flatly refuse to recognize any judgments
rendered by our courts. 75 But even countries generally friendly to the
United States may, and likely will, decline to enforce our money
judgments where those judgments are based on notions of service of
171. § 2002(d).
172. See Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims, supra note 158, at
239-43 (discussing concerns regarding FSIA's conditioning normalization of relations
with terrorist states on recovery of payments made to judgment creditors).
173. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at
846-49 (surveying authorities and observing that enforcement of foreign judgments
commonly proceeds from notions of comity as a matter of respect for the sovereign
power of the rendering state).
174. The United States is a signatory to a multi-lateral treaty that requires courts in
signatory countries to recognize and enforce foreign arbitration awards. Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 7, 1959).
175. Of course, even an overtly hostile country's leadership may change over time,
or at least be willing to compensate victims of terrorism allegedly sponsored by that
country. See, e.g., Warren P. Strobel, Frozen for Years, U.S.-Libyan Relations May Be
Nearing a Thaw, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., March 3, 2002, at A12 (discussing Libya's
indication that it may pay billions of dollars in compensation to the families of those who
died in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland); Andrew Buncombe,
Libya to Pay Damages for Lockerbie, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 20, 2002, at 14
(discussing secret deal being finalized by Libya, Britain and United States under which
Libya would compensate victims of Pan Am 103 bombing); Barbara Crossette, $2.6
Million Awarded to Families in Letelier Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at All
(describing proposed payments by Chile of $2.6 million to United States, pursuant to an
arbitration award, for the families of Letelier and Moffat as compensation for state-
sponsored assassinations).
process or personal jurisdiction inconsistent with their views on these
procedural requirements. 176
A judgment rendered by a court in the United States will not be
recognized in another country unless service of process was accomplished in
accordance with the laws of the country where recognition is sought.
Failure to comply with the Hague Service Convention where deemed
applicable by another signatory country, for example, will likely mean
that a resulting judgment will be unenforceable in that country, even
though the judgment is valid within the United States court system. 177
This is particularly true with respect to default judgments, which are
subject to several specific rules under the Hague Service Convention. 78
Consequently, a plaintiff who anticipates enforcement of a judgment in
another signatory country would be ill-advised to avoid the Convention's
procedures by substituted or constructive service within the United
States, under circumstances where the other country views the Convention's
requirements applicable.
Even where a United States judgment is based on procedural standards
consistent with those of the foreign country, that country may decline to
recognize the judgment based on its notions of public policy. 179 For
example, most countries do not permit their courts to award punitive
damages or treble damages in civil actions, and may therefore refuse to
enforce any United States judgment that includes such damages.' 80
176. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 33, at 844-54 (surveying cases and
authorities); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 89, 114-16 (1999) (explaining that most other countries will not
respect United States judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction, such as general
jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic contacts); Patrick J. Borchers,
Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community:
Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 133-36 (analyzing Brussels
Convention and concluding that European countries do not accept personal jurisdiction
based on continuous and systematic business contacts with forum). See also authorities
cited supra note 67.
177. See supra notes 67 & 72-75 and accompanying text.
178. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention, the United States has
declared that no default judgment shall be given unless the complaint and summons was
transmitted by one of the methods provided for in the Convention and service was
effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend; or, if no certificate of
service has been received from the relevant Central Authority, a period of at least six
months has elapsed since the date of the transmission and every reasonable attempt has
been made to obtain a certificate of service. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 28 U.S.C.A. app.
(West 2001) (Declarations of the United States).
179. Referring to the near universality of this public policy exception, Professor
Lowenfeld observed "it is generally accepted that the law of recognition of judgments,
whether expressed in statute, treaty, judicial decision, or even a Restatement, must leave
some safety valve for violation of public policy or ordre public." Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the Von Mehren
Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (1994).
180. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments
[VOL. 3: 1, 2002] Civil Litigation
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
Also, most countries follow more stringent rules regarding sovereign
immunity than those applicable in oir courts, and may decline to
recognize any United States judgment against a sovereign entity under
the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of the FSIA. A foreign
country asked to enforce a United States judgment need not have a
rational reason for its refusal, or any reason at all for that matter. A
country may simply decline to recognize a money judgment rendered by
a United States court against an international terrorist because that
country views such inaction as politically expedient.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are several practical and legal obstacles to the effective use of
civil litigation as a means of deterring, and compensating victims of,
international terrorism. The practical problems may be insurmountable.
The threat of a civil judgment obviously will not deter individuals who
are willing to commit suicide in order to achieve terrorist goals. A civil
judgment against a foreign state who sponsors such terrorist acts may be
more effective, but only if that state considers rapprochement with the
United States as a desirable goal. Despite these obvious practical
obstacles, there is little reason why the rules of procedural law should
add unnecessary barriers to obtaining and enforcing a civil judgment
against international terrorists.
A. The Supreme Court Should Resolve the Personal Jurisdiction
and Choice-of-Law Issues Relevant to Litigation
Involving International Terrorism
With respect to personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court should
consider and resolve two important issues. One is whether the "national
contacts" approach to minimum contacts is consistent with the Due
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 167, 181-84 (1998) (discussing statutes and decisions from several countries
that have refused, on grounds of public policy, to enforce punitive damages portions of
judgments from United States courts); Dellapenna, supra note 84, at 241 (observing that
foreign courts generally will not enforce United States judgments for punitive damages);
Lowenfeld, supra note 179, at 293 (same).
181. See Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 700-03 (discussing the FSIA's state-
sponsored terrorism provisions, observing that no other nation would similarly subject
foreign states to such suits by private parties, and concluding that other countries will
refuse to enforce such judgments on public policy grounds).
Process Clause. The second is whether a foreign country is a "person"
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and, if so, the extent to
which the traditional "minimum contacts" test applies to foreign
sovereign entities. 182 These issues are unlikely to come before any
appellate court in the context of international terrorism because nearly
all those cases are resolved by default judgments, and therefore are not
appealed by defendants. However, the Supreme Court can resolve these
issues in the context of traditional commercial litigation, under the FSIA
or otherwise. Because any ruling on these two due process issues will
have ramifications beyond cases involving international terrorism, the
Supreme Court probably should resolve them in the context of more
traditional litigation, such as an action against a foreign sovereign entity
brought pursuant to the commercial activity provisions of the FSIA or an
action against a foreign private party pursuant to a federal statue that
authorizes nationwide service of process. Regardless of how raised,
each of these issues deserves a more definitive resolution than currently
exists in any context. The Supreme Court should decide these issues in a
manner that upholds the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction
exercised pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism provisions in section
1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.
Some of the other unresolved issues discussed above, such as the
propriety of the use of federal common law to supply the rules of
decision under the state-sponsored terrorism provisions of the FSIA and
the proper reach of the Act of State Doctrine, also deserve attention by
appellate courts, and perhaps even by the Supreme Court. The most
significant issues, of course, have to do with enforcement of judgments.
Most of those issues cannot be resolved by the courts because they are
not questions of statutory or constitutional construction. They are
political issues, and sensitive ones at that, and as such require action by
Congress and by the Executive on both the domestic and the
international fronts.
B. The United States Should Attempt to Negotiate a Multinational
Treaty Focusing on Personal Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments as to Tort Actions
The United States is currently involved in an attempt to negotiate a
multilateral treaty on personal jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments
in international civil litigation, through the Hague Conference on Private
182. If the Court is unwilling to rule directly on these Due Process Clause issues, it
should at least clarify how "reasonableness" factors into the context of the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants alleged to have committed acts of
international terrorism. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
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International Law. 183  Because of fundamental disagreements over
appropriate bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the prospects
for a successful comprehensive treaty are doubtful. 184 However, most, if
not all countries do agree on a proper basis for personal jurisdiction in
intentional tort cases: the courts of a state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose intentional and
wrongful acts were committed, and directly caused injury or death,
within that state. 185 A multilateral treaty that incorporates this universal
rule of personal jurisdiction, and requires other signatory countries to
recognize and enforce tort judgments obtained through use of this
jurisdictional rule, would be an improvement over the current
discretionary approach to enforcement of foreign judgments. This could
be accomplished through the current Hague Conference negotiations, or
through a less comprehensive multilateral treaty concerned only with
intentional tort actions.
186
A multilateral treaty that covers intentional tort actions would mean a
183. A Preliminary Draft of this proposed treaty, referred to as the Hague
Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matter, was adopted by the Special Commission on October 30, 1999.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [hereinafter
Preliminary Draft], at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.hl (last visited April 18,
2002).
184. For thoughtful discussions of the various problems associated with the current
attempt to draft a proposed Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction, see Ronald
A. Brand, Due Process Jurisdiction and A Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. Prr. L.
REv. 661, 701-05 (1999); Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral
Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24
BROOK J. INT'L L. 125, 144-53 (1998); Clermont, supra note 176, at 106-07; Arthur T.
von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for
the Hague Conference, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994); Lowenfeld, supra note
179, at 290-91.
185. The Brussels Convention, for example, authorizes personal jurisdiction in tort
cases in the courts of the country "where the harmful event occurred." Brussels
Convention, supra note 23, art. 5(3). See Heiser, supra note 14 at 941-42 (discussing
interpretations of Article 5(3) by the European Court of Justice which authorize suit in
tort cases in the place where the physical injury has occurred); Brand, Due Process,
supra note 184, at 693-701 (same); Brand, Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 184, at 142-54
(same); Borchers, supra note 176, at 143-46 (same).
186. The preliminary draft of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction provides that a
plaintiff may bring a tort action in the courts of the State "in which the act ... that
caused the injury occurred," or "in which the injury arose, unless the defendant
establishes that person claimed to be responsible could not have reasonably foreseen that
the act.. could result in an injury of the same nature in that State." Preliminary Draft,
supra note 183, art. 10.
victim of international terrorism within the United States who obtains a
valid civil judgment here would have the authority to enforce that
judgment in another signatory country, where the defendant perhaps has
reachable assets. The prospects for agreement on the terms of such a
limited treaty would seem to be much better than those for a more
comprehensive treaty, such as the proposed Hague Convention on
International Jurisdiction.
Of course, even though there may be agreement on the fundamental
issue of personal jurisdiction in tort actions, additional obstacles to a
successful treaty still remain. One is that such a multilateral treaty
would likely only apply to actions against private parties unless carefully
crafted to protect the sovereign immunity of foreign state entities when
enforcement is sought in a third-party country. 187 Another is that other
countries are unlikely to agree to enforcement of punitive damages
awards. 188  Even if a proposed treaty did not require recognition of
punitive damages judgments, many countries view compensatory
damages awarded by United States courts as excessive. 189 However, the
current Hague Conference negotiations suggest that these obstacles may
be overcome if the United States is willing to compromise in these
areas.190 Of course, practical problems will still remain, such as inability
to identify and locate assets in foreign countries because they are
187. See Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 700-03 (discussing the difficulties
encountered when enforcing an FSIA-based judgment in a third-party foreign country);
Dellapenna, supra note 84, at 286-87 (observing that in attempting to enforce a judgment
against a foreign state outside the United States, the judgment creditor will encounter all
the usual difficulties in executing judgments abroad plus restrictions on the execution of
judgments against foreign states under the law of the country where enforcement is
sought).
188. See Lowenfeld, supra note 179, at 293 (advising that the United States should
be prepared to agree expressly that punitive damages be excluded from a recognition and
enforcement treaty, providing that a judgment awarding both punitive and compensatory
damages could be upheld as to compensatory elements); Patrick J. Borchers, A Few
Little Issues for the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 24 Brook. J. Int'l L. 157, 163 (1998)
(same). See also authorities cited supra note 180.
189. See Borchers, supra note 188, at 162-64 (observing the propensity of the
United States legal system to award tort damages considerably in excess of those usually
awarded in other systems is the source of much concern in the Hague negotiations);
Weintraub, supra note 180, at 203-04 (1998) (advising that the problem of punitive,
multiple, and excessive damages can be dealt with under a general public policy
exception to enforcement, which any judgments convention will undoubtedly include).
190. The Preliminary Draft of the proposed Hague Convention on Personal
Jurisdiction provides that recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if
"recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of
the State addressed." Preliminary Draft, supra note 183, art. 28(1)(f). As to damages,
Article 33(1) of the Preliminary Draft provides that "in so far as a judgment awards non-
compensatory, including exemplary or punitive damages, it shall be recognized at least
to the extent that similar or comparable damages could have been awarded in the State
addressed." Preliminary Draft, supra note 183, art. 33(l).
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protected from disclosure by bank secrecy laws, or, more fundamentally,
because they are secreted by the judgment debtors. Moreover, countries
sympathetic to certain terrorist causes, likely the same countries in
which terrorist judgment debtors' assets are located, may simply decline
to sign any multilateral treaty on enforcement of judgments.
C. Congress and the President Should Develop a Comprehensive
Program of Compensation for Victims of
International Terrorism
On November 28, 2001, Congress enacted legislation which requires
the President to submit, by the time of submission of the budget for fiscal
year 2003, a legislative proposal to establish "a comprehensive program to
ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States
victims of international terrorism (or relatives of deceased United States
victims of international terrorism) that occurred or occurs on or after
November 1, 1979.''91 This is a wise approach. It permits the Executive
Branch to develop a program that reflects both foreign policy concerns
as well as the domestic goals of compensation and deterrence. Hopefully, the
resulting legislation will produce a coordinated, straightforward scheme
of compensation for victims of international terrorism.
One proposal Congress and the Executive might consider would be a
hybrid combination of the statutory scheme currently in effect to
compensate victims of terrorist acts sponsored by Iran or Cuba under the
most recent amendments to the FSIA, and of the recently enacted
program to compensate victims of the September 11 terrorist acts. The
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 establishes a
program, administered by a Special Master, to provide compensation to
any individual or relatives of deceased individual who was physically
injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of
September 11, 2001.192 An individual may file a claim for compensation
191. Pub. L. No. 107-77,.§ 626(a), 115 Stat. 748 (2001). Congress also directed
that "the legislative proposal shall include, among other things, which types of events
should be covered; which categories of individuals should be covered by a compensation
program; ... the establishment of a Special Master to administer the program, the
categories of injuries for which there should be compensation; ... and identifiable
sources of funds including assets of any state sponsor of terrorism to make payments
under the program." Id. at § 626(b).
192. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, §§ 401-09 (2001), 115 Stat. 230, reprinted at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Dec.
2001).
with the Special Master and, upon a determination of eligibility, will
receive payments based on the compensation plan established by the
Special Master.193 The amount of the compensation is based on the
claimant's extent of harm, including economic and noneconomic losses,
but cannot include punitive damages. 94 Upon submission of a claim,
the claimant waives the right to file a civil action for damages sustained
as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001,
except an action to recover collateral source obligations. 95 The United
States has the right of subrogation with respect to any claim paid by the
United States under this compensation program. 1
96
Payments pursuant to this compensation program for victims of the
September 11 terrorist attacks are the obligation of the federal
government. 197 The President and Congress should consider whether to
extend this funding approach to all victims of international terrorism.
For example, Congress could amend the FSIA to obligate the federal
government to compensate plaintiffs who have obtained money
judgments against any foreign sovereign entities, not only those whose
property has been previously blocked, for injuries caused by their state-
sponsored terrorism. The compensation and subrogation scheme could
be the similar to the one currently in effect for payment of such
judgments against Cuba and Iran under Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA). 98 For example, the United
States could pay the entire amount (or whatever portion of the amount is
fiscally appropriate) of the compensatory damages portion of the
judgment, and in return obtain an assignment of the judgment creditor's
right to the remaining damages, such as treble and punitive damages. As
in the VTVPA, the judgment creditor would agree to relinquish all
claims and rights to further damages, and the United States would be
subrogated to the rights of the judgment creditor against the debtor
foreign state. 199 However, unlike the VTVPA, the President would be
urged, but not be required, to recoup these amounts as a prerequisite to
releasing blocked assets or normalizing relations with the debtor foreign
state. This aproach would remove two of the major concerns regarding
the VTVPA. The President's foreign policy activities would not be
193. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at §§ 405-07.
194. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at §§ 402, 405(b).
195. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at §§ 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
196. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at § 409.
197. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note, at § 406(b) & (c).
198. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
199. A similar approach could also be enacted to compensate judgment creditors of
non-sovereign terrorist groups designated as "foreign terrorist organizations" by the
Executive branch pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a) (2000).
200. For a good discussion of these concerns regarding the FSIA's state-sponsored
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constrained by a recoupment precondition to normalization of relations
with terrorist nations; and the assets of the United States overseas would
likely not be subject to attachment and execution in retaliatory judgments
obtained in foreign courts.
Such a proposal would assure that victims of international terrorism
are compensated and would authorize the federal government to pursue
reimbursement or other appropriate political action on their behalf, and
would do so with minimal interference with the Executive branch's
conduct of United States foreign policy. Any such comprehensive
program would be an improvement over the scheme currently in effect
which, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, relies on piecemeal civil
litigation and a hodge-podge of rules regarding enforcement of judgments.
terrorism provisions, such as the possible seizure of United States assets abroad in
execution of retaliatory judgments obtained under foreign laws and, more generally, the
undermining of the Executive's authority in the area of foreign policy, see Hell-Bent on
Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims, supra note 158, at 236-43 (explaining why the
Executive Branch has opposed enforcement of some of the state-sponsored terrorism
amendments); Glannon & Atik, supra note 60, at 701-06 (suggesting that the presence of
state-sponsored terrorism lawsuits may interfere with the Executive's conduct of United
States foreign policy).
50
